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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 05/03/2011 Accident number: 631 
Accident time: 09:19 Accident Date: 08/07/2008 





Primary cause: Victim inattention (?) Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: Not recorded 
ID original source: OPS/14101-17 Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 05/03/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date was in a UNMACA 
accident summary. The conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost.  Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised as more 
information becomes available. 
The summary is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
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Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) 
File: OPS/14101-17 
Date: August 12, 2009 
Subject: INVESTIGATION REPORT LESSONS LEARNED OF [Demining group] MU-16 
DEMINING ACCIDENT IN SAMANGAN PROVINCE  
Attached please find the investigation report and Lessons Learned from the demining 
accident, occurred to one of deminer of [Demining group] MU-16 on 08 July 2009 at 09:19 
hours in Pusht-t-Band (Burma) Village, Saharhagh district of Samangan Province. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] MU-16 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION: 
An investigation team was convened by AMAC North to investigate the demining accident 
involving [the Victim] the deminer of [Demining group] MU-16. The accident occurred at 
09:19hrs on 08 July 2009 at minefield number AF/1506/13176/H- 5157, located in Pusht-e- 
Band (Burma) village, Khoram Saharbagh district of Samangan Province. 
SUMMARY: 
Minefield # AF/1506/1317611-1- 5157 is located on a hill about 500 metres away from the 
village of Burma, which was front line between belligerent groups during internal war. From 
the military point of view this area was important for both sides of the conflict factions; 
therefore, the AP mines were laid there in 1991 by Sayed Kayan militia to stop the attacks of 
their opposition. Four accidents occurred on animal from 1996 to 1998. However, the area is 
mined but it is partially cultivated by villagers. 
On 1st July 2009 MU-16 of [Demining group] started clearance operation on mentioned task, 
On 08 July 2009 at 0919hrs while [the Victim] was investigating a signal in his clearance lane, 
he found two bullets. He re-checked the spot and found the same signal, this process 
repeated for three times. Finally he found a root stump in the excavation trench with a 
thickness of around 2.5 cm and started to remove it, because it was blocking further 
excavation there. However the deminer had proper tool in his toolkit to cut such obstacles, but 
he tried to out it with his scraper. After a few chops of the root stump with a scraper, a PMN 
mine was initiated and caused the accident. As it seems from the investigation report, the root 
was located on the pressure plate of mine, so it went off because of applying pressure on it. 
Fortunately as the deminer was fully dressed with PPE, he got some non-critical injuries. The 
visor was scratched by accident so he got some injuries on his face, but none of the injuries 
were severe. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The accident occurred because of carelessness of deminer, as he wanted to remove the root 
stump for further investigation of a detected signal, but used the scraper instead of secateurs 
available in his toolkit. The command group did not pay attention to see and stop him from 
such action. 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
However, the [Demining group] has taken disciplinary actions against the command group, 
but as a lessons learned the following points are to be considered by all demining teams: 
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A. The command group should strictly control the deminers during the operations and stop 
them when practicing in contrary to the organization SOP. 
B. The deminers should not hurry up during the excavation, be careful and seek guidance 
from their command group when facing such obstacles during the operations. 
C. Demining organizations should make sure that their team deminers know the approved 
safe working procedures and if needed refresher training is to be conducted. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 813 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Face 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as Victim Inattention because it seems that the 
Victim worked incautiously despite having appropriate tools to hand. The secondary cause is 
listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the Victim’s errors – which probably included 
wearing a raised visor) were not corrected. The demining group’s senior management 
apparently acted tio correct field supervision errors, so are to be commended. 
This demining group wear a frontal vest that does not have a collar interfacing with the visor 
(so does not meet the minimum IMAS requirement) so it is possible that ejecta from the blast 
could have struck the Victim’s lower face and throat without the visor being raised. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years 
in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. The existence of a good summary implies 
that the Afghan investigators carried out a professional investigation and generated a detailed 
report that should be shared. 
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